Almost two weeks after the 2016 presidential election, Uganda is yet to settle down as the ‘normal’ country it was before February 18. We had the incumbent announced as having won by over 60 per cent. His closest contender Kizza Besigye of FDC came second with about 35.5 per cent.
Yet there is significant presence of the police and military on the streets of Kampala and most parts of the country. The contenders Go Forward’s Amama Mbabazi and especially Besigye have had severe restrictions to their movements and associations, like the winners are afraid of them.
These actions by security agencies of beating the ‘defeated’ as they lie prostrate on the canvass, presumably having taken a knockout in the election, have implications.
They seem like the actions of a winner who is not sure that he won genuinely or that it even sounds convincing to all and sundry. So he must use force to subdue his opponents and look too scary to be questioned. The stories of the abundance of pre-ticked ballots, is out in the open. The late arrival of election materials to areas where the Opposition has traditionally done well i.e. Kampala and Wakiso, augment this notion. The decision by the Electoral Commission not to announce results from all polling stations (leaving out places like Rukungiri where the Opposition has done well in the past) because of ‘Constitutional time constraints,’ is yet another point. How come time was never thought of when late delivering voter materials in the areas mentioned above, some will ask?
The continued enforcement by armed men on the streets in the short-run maintains peace that is costly and not sustainable. A time will come when the men with arms will have to go back to the barracks. Yet the contention is likely to remain i.e. the cynicism and disbelief in the results that the EC declared and by extension, the winner President Yoweri Museveni.
Uganda and Museveni in particular are beneficiaries of Western power and international finance or call it donor leverage. This lot minds a lot about stability in two ways. First in terms of securing the uninterrupted return on the investments that they make in poor countries like Uganda. They would want to be guaranteed long-term assurances that a leader like Museveni will not encounter disruptive Opposition because he is unpopular. The current situation seems to suggest that he has slid into that situation despite the ‘resounding’ over 60 per cent win he has on paper. Secondly, as they have learnt from the migrant crisis in North Africa and the Middle East, it puts their countries under a lot of security and financial pressure to settle refugees that flock in from spots of insecurity that stem from contentions over governance.
In his book, ‘Kizza Besigye And Uganda’s Unfinished Revolution’, Daniel K. Kalinaki gives an account of a dressing down Besigye received from foreign ambassadors at the Irish Ambassador’s residence in Kololo, after he lost the election in 2011. The diplomats saw Besigye’s dismissal of the election results in which he was given 26.01 per cent as opposed to Museveni’s 68.38 per cent as the work of a ‘sore loser.’ The diplomats ‘put stability over constitutional scruples’ and mercilessly went for Besigye and humiliated him.
Five years later, the diplomats have been more civil and accommodating towards Besigye. They have spoken out with an uncharacteristic bluntness about the veracity of the election saying that Ugandans deserved better and called for publication of results per polling station. They have paid Besigye visits and encouraged him to go to court.
We may end up with the main protagonists Museveni, Besigye and Mbabazi being called onto the negotiating table -using both the carrot and stick- by those who fund our economy. Besigye and Mbabazi may be asked to acknowledge Museveni (not necessarily as election winner) as the President for the next five years -despite ‘all that has happened.’
Besigye and Mbabazi may then put forward demands for constitutional and electoral reforms. The main ones being the restoration of two five year-term limits for which Museveni may not be eligible. Trimming of the powers of the Executive, especially in regards to access and use of public finance for elections. Removal of the army and the police in the management of elections plus a more open and egalitarian mode of composing the Electoral Commission in which the incumbent will have limited or no influence.
The 2016 election like I once suggested now appears like a beginning and not just an end to a normal event. It seems like the journey to end the revolution of 1986, which gives Museveni a sense of entitlement to rule Uganda without reservation, is about to begin.
Mr Sengoba is a commentator on political and social issues. nicholassengoba@yahoo.com
Twitter: @nsengoba
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